It is February 2017. I graduated from high school less than a year ago and began “adulting” by moving to China entirely on my own. Shortly before the Chinese New Year, I left my then-home in Xiamen, Fujian Province, by taking a boat to the island of Kinmen, a territory of the Republic of China. It was just a 30-minute commute, yet it opened my horizons to a completely new reality.

The domestic flight from Kinmen to the city of Taichung on the island of Taiwan took longer: about one hour. Soon after, I was crossing Taiwan’s mountains toward Hualien, all by myself, with a backpack on my shoulders, helped along the way by local people who—often without me even asking—made sure I reached my destination safely. I fell in love with Taiwan, and I was at an age that is perfect for falling in love.

Poland and Taiwan do not have diplomatic relations, which is no surprise. Taiwan’s status is complicated, as we all know. Beneath the endless debates about “the one-China policy,” “strategic ambiguity,” “cross-strait relations,” and other catchphrases straight from my Political Science classroom, the practical side prevails. Economic ties between Poland and Taiwan began to take shape in the late 1980s and early 1990s, alongside democratization processes in both countries. In 1992, Taiwan opened its representative office in Warsaw—the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office—followed in 1995 by the establishment of Poland’s representative office in Taipei, the Warsaw Trade Office. (1)

But neither I nor Poland were done with Taiwan in those early days. 2018 marked an important milestone in bilateral relations: the opening of the Polish Investment and Trade Agency’s Foreign Trade Office in Taipei, established to promote business relations and support investment. A year later, I began preparing my application for National Taiwan University.

Then came 2020, and with it devastating news: a mysterious disease from Wuhan dominated global headlines. We all know the story.

Taiwan became a poster child for crisis management. But at that time, it was bad news for me. My Master’s destination was completely locked down, and it seemed I might never get the chance to slip in. It took months of serious nerves before my trip was finally confirmed: thanks to my university’s bold bureaucratic support. In September 2020, Taiwan welcomed me with a long and expensive quarantine, but it was the warmest welcome possible under the circumstances.

In April 2020, at the height of global demand for protective equipment, Poland benefited from Taiwan’s health diplomacy by receiving a donation of 500,000 masks, later increased to one million. As a gesture of solidarity, Poland in turn donated 400,000 doses of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine to Taiwan, becoming the third-largest vaccine donor to the ROC at the time. (2)

Alongside new COVID cases, the potential for Poland–Taiwan technological cooperation was also growing. Poland had been eyeing Taiwan carefully: acting more cautiously than Lithuania. While working at the Polish Office in Taipei, I could see this firsthand. In 2022, I served as a consecutive interpreter during consultations in Taiwan with Grzegorz Piechowiak, Secretary of State and Government Plenipotentiary for Foreign Investments at the Ministry of Development and Technology. Mutual relations were kept at the vice-secretary level.

But 2022 brought yet another geopolitical calamity: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I witnessed large protests in Taiwan outside the Russian representative office. Taiwan stood out among its Asian neighbors, including Japan and South Korea. One Ukrainian volunteer in Taiwan, of Korean descent, told me he received more sympathy for his cause in Taiwan than among his Korean friends. In my view, this was because many Taiwanese saw themselves in Ukrainians, comparing Ukraine’s struggle against Russia to Taiwan’s struggle against China. As a byproduct, Poland also began to appear in Taiwanese media: and the coverage was overwhelmingly positive.

Call it sympathy, but there is also an element of competition. Poland aims to position itself as a new market for Taiwanese investment, while competing with the Czech Republic and Lithuania. These two smaller neighbors have long-standing and well-developed business relations with Taiwan. Poland, on the other hand, offers a larger population—and thus a larger market—along with new opportunities. Step by step, my country has begun to present itself as one of Taiwan’s strategic partners.

Later that year, a Polish–Taiwanese working group on semiconductors was established. In June 2023, during the visit of Minister Kung Ming-hsin from the National Development Council, an agreement on cooperation in microelectronics was signed between EXATEL S.A. and Chunghwa Telecom, alongside an agreement to create a hydrogen group. And in September 2023, Poland participated in Semicon Taiwan for the very first time: a thrilling moment I took part in personally.

The story of Poland–Taiwan relations is still being written. From health diplomacy during the pandemic to the emerging semiconductor and clean-tech partnerships, each step adds a new layer to this relationship. Having seen it from both the personal and professional side, I believe Poland and Taiwan have the potential to move beyond cautious pragmatism toward a genuine, strategic partnership.

Sources:

(1) Poland in Taiwan. (n.d.). Taiwan. Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Taipei. Retrieved August 19, 2025, from https://poland.tw/web/tajwan/tajwan

(2) Global Taiwan Institute. (2024, December 11). Poland and its Indo-Pacific strategy in the making. Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/12/poland-and-its-indo-pacific-strategy-in-the-making/